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Lateral Ethics, Moral Particularism, and Nationality
Ryuichiro Taniguchi
　〔抄録〕
道徳には，理性をもってだけでは適切に考慮されえない，特有の理由が存する。
道徳の行為者が超えてはならない多種多様な範囲と限界，そして境界が，道徳を限
定づけている。多くのコミュニティの道徳（コミュニティ内道徳）は互いに異なる
し，その結果，それらの間ではコンフリクトが避けられない。本論考は，次の三つ
の議論を通じて，多元的社会の公共圏の倫理の形成の過程——本稿はこれを「横超」
という言葉で表現する——を，異質な他者や見知らぬ者たちへの共感を通じて，自
己の内的規制としての道徳を超え出て彼らと結びつき，分かち合い，連帯するとい
う，自己の道徳の境界の開放と拡張のプロセスであるとして描述する。すなわち，
第一に，これらの道徳上の差異には，それでも重なり合う部分が存在すること，第
二に，重なり合う倫理は，道徳のアプリオリな普遍的原理との突き合わせをするこ
とも，ある種の哲学的なコスモポリタニズムに屈することも必要としないこと，第
三に，倫理的個別主義に依拠し，「横超の倫理（lateral ethic）」とナショナリティ
の関係を明らかにすることを通じて，多元的な現代民主主義社会の公共ないし多様
な諸コミュニティの間におけるプラグマティックな倫理の形成について論じる。
The life of man is a self-evolving circle, which, from a ring impercep-
tibly small, rushes on all sides outwards to new and larger circles, 
and that without end.
The one thing which we seek with insatiable desire is to forget 
ourselves, to be surprised out of our propriety, to lose our sempi-
ternal memory and to do something without knowing how or why; 
in short to draw a new circle.
Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Circles”(1)
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1. Circle of Morality
Morality, which I discuss in this paper, is that which comes into being as 
the binding force of community develops epigenetically: it starts out as a 
relation of reciprocal trust, or perhaps love, among a closely-knit group 
such as a family or clan, and progresses to an obligation to relatively larger 
communities or societies, then to a national duty to fellow nationals. As 
such, it neither a priori falls from heaven, nor is it commanded by Mt. Sinai 
of morality. It appears first as internal regulations of individual behavior, 
which are by and large constructed by norms of community (let us call this 
kind of morality “intracommunity-morality”) and then as an ethic between 
different communities (let us call this kind of ethic “intercommunity-ethic” 
or “public ethic”(2)). The ethic I describe in this paper is the process in 
which through empathy and sensitivity we understand the moral situations 
in which people outside our community are. Such understanding requires 
us to be more sensitive to those situations and to pay more attention to 
them, the attention which we naturally tend to focus inward on our own 
community. In other words, this is the process of expanding the horizon of 
one’s moral consideration toward outside one’s moral community.
That ethic seeks in principle neither the a priori, universal principles 
of morality that are fundamentally common to intrinsic norms immanent 
to communities. Nor does it justify moral actions by virtue of conforming 
to those principles, which transcend the horizon of human experience. Yet 
it strives to transcend the boundaries of one’s moral community in order 
to build moral bonds with people of other communities. It does so without 
putting the bonds in a hierarchical order. Thus such bonding is of a lateral 
or rhizomatous relation between different moralities. What this rhizom-
atous ethic aspires to is to expand moral boundaries through empathy to 
others: to build moral bonds with them and to work on common moral 
matters in solidarity by transcending the boundaries of one’s own moral 
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community. The stronger the bonds, the stronger the binding force of the 
rhizomatous ethics. The latter expands as it overlaps with other moralities, 
personal or communal. Such an overlapping I call “overlapping morality” 
or “overlaps of different moralities.” And the ethics that deals with such an 
overlapping ethic, I call “lateral ethics.”
By lateral ethics, I mean both the process of laterally expanding the 
binding force of a community and the process of mutual understanding 
between communities which brings about a wider binding force between 
them through the empathic and sensitive consideration of moral situa-
tions of other communities. One’s morality as the internal regulation 
of one’s conduct, as it goes through incessant interactions with other 
intracommunity-moralities, is to increasingly expand loyalty to one’s own 
community to loyalty to a larger community. Nevertheless, as I discuss 
bellow, lateral ethics does not regard loyalty to a larger community as 
that which converges with the largest loyalty to the largest community. 
Nor does it converge with the universal moral principle. A lateral ethic 
ameliorates according to the overlaps of moralities or intracommunity-
moralities, of which the scope and features change on different occasions. 
When moralities are overlapped, it is required that the conflicts between 
them be sensitively dealt with: a morality may rely on a sort of articulate 
moral principle on one occasion; on anther occasion, it may be a generally 
recognized norm although it is not articulable. What is required to decide 
what and how to do in either case is the moral judgment that sensitively 
deals with particular moral situations by better-scrutinizing them.
Augustine compares the nature of God to “a circle whose center 
is everywhere, and its circumference nowhere.” Lateral ethics indeed 
resembles depicting such a circle: a circle of morality. The center of the 
formation of lateral ethics is ubiquitous, and various overlaps of moralities 
are formed as if they were in a circular pattern depicting many a wave 
rings, which are formed another and yet another. To borrow Alexander 
Pope’s expression, “As the small peddle stirs the peaceful lake; / The 
centre mov’d, / a circle strait succeeds, / Another still, and still another 
ky6021Taniguchi_d.indd   23 16.1.24   4:18:51 AM
24
spreads.”(3) Along with this formation, the crossing parts of those circles—
which are overlapping moralities—are formed one after another though 
some circles may well embrace others at times. Lateral ethics hence is 
in contrast to traditional western philosophy which in principle seeks the 
all-encompassing circle—everlasting, transcendent and sublime reality or 
some universal moral principle— that transcends the particularity of each 
individual circle. Therefore, those circles are not concentric ones. The 
individual centers of the circles signify the moral matters or ethical issues 
that are to be sensitively examined and particularly dealt with.
2. Moral Boundary
Likewise a lateral ethic develops cooperatively between communities 
that align with one another. When different intracommunity-moralities 
recognize one another relativizing their moral life as part of the more 
comprehensive moral life of communities as a whole, the lateral ethic 
developing among them may well be universal in the scope of the comprehen-
siveness.
When a collective sense of moral unity is shared by dif ferent 
communities or by individuals, and when they recognize fellow nationals 
one another within that comprehensiveness, and, moreover, when they 
thus have a hunger to make all political decisions by themselves, the 
comprehensive community comes to exist as a nation. Typically, nation 
is born out of ethnic community. The national features fellow nationals 
share are primarily stemmed neither from genetic properties nor from 
sharing the same language and culture. For it is quite possible that even 
though people are of different language and culture they are still the same 
nationals. As the same nationals they are connected to a certain territory 
and accept as their own the actions of the people of the past who belonged 
to the same nation. They seek to preserve the genuineness of the cultural 
and linguistic features and make political decisions for future of their 
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nation. They thus feel a moral obligation to their fellow nationals. In this 
way, they share a collective sense of moral unity. It is very natural for us 
to have priority to moral duties to our nationals over those to the nationals 
of other nations, and this is in fact what is common throughout the world. 
To put it in another way, although a lateral ethic extends across the inside 
and outside of national boundaries, our moral duties must be once sharply 
distinguished from those to the nationals of other nations: there is a moral 
boundary between them. Perhaps, obligations, as opposed to those duties, 
enter into the picture only when our loyalty to our smaller community 
conflicts with our loyalty to a larger community.
Nevertheless, that an ethic expands beyond such a moral boundary is 
not contradictory to that people of a nation give a priority to moral duties to 
their fellow nationals over those to the nationals of other nations outside of 
the moral boundary. For the former are still able to genuinely feel empathy 
for the latter by sensitively understanding their predicaments. People who 
live in a free country can think and worry for the oppressed people, say, 
under the dictatorship. Although they cannot join the marching of the 
oppressed, they can still empathize with them by imaginatively and sensi-
tively understanding their suffering and humiliation.
However, we should be careful about this kind of empathy at least in 
three respects. Firstly, when we find ourselves empathetic with the people 
of some nation we should be cautious about whether or not their claims 
of suffering and humiliation and for help are genuine or whether those 
are meretricious and fraudulent. If they are, we might well be deceived 
and gulled out of our bona fide offer. The resulting relation between us 
is far from mutual respect. Worse yet, if they scheme to get an upper 
hand over us in diplomatic negotiations since the beginning, and if they 
succeed slickly, we yield to their unilateral demand. Secondly, it should be 
noticed that unilaterally sympathizing with their plight is quite different 
from genuinely empathizing with their predicaments. Such sympathy, not 
empathy, makes us to pique their sense of pride all the more because we 
try to help them out of pity; genuine empathy leads us to treat them with 
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reciprocal respect. Thirdly, there may be the case that both parties cannot 
establish at all any effective overlap of their beliefs and desires. In that 
case, such empathy could amount to be of no avail in finding resources to 
permit agreement on how to coexist without moral antagonism and thus 
resulting in violence unless they give up on the attempt to get the other 
party to enlarge their moral identity and settle for working out a proper 
distance with one another.
Insofar as we are not in those three cases, we can experience the 
world as a unity of progressive reciprocity, which consists of a constellation 
of nations. Through that experience human beings are oriented to the 
awareness that they need to seek the world as such a unity, while it yet 
takes on conflicting currents within itself, in which nations do not so much 
demean each other as recognize themselves as different in mutual respect.
3. Lateral Ethic as “ Justice as a Larger Loyalty”
American neo-pragmatist Richard Rorty sees “moral progress as a matter 
of being able to respond to the needs of ever more inclusive groups of 
people.”(4) He contends that “it is better to think of moral progress as a 
matter of increasing sensitivity, increasing responsiveness to the needs of 
a larger and larger variety of people and things.”(5) In his paper “Justice as 
a Larger Loyalty,” he maintains that justice or morality is, after all, loyalty 
to groups or communities, and that such loyalty can be expanded to even 
much larger groups or communities.(6) Justice as a loyalty does not so 
much start out as a social contract or rational calculation as undertakes as 
a relation of a reciprocal trust among a closely-knit group of people, and 
progresses to loyalty to ever more inclusive communities.
Thus, morality does not stem from a single common idea or principle. 
It does not develop from the context-free, abstract “thin” rational principle 
into what Michael Walzer calls “thick morality.” The reverse is true. Walzer 
writes, “Morality is thick from the beginning, culturally integrated, fully 
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resonant, and it reveals itself thinly only on special occasions, when moral 
language is turned to special purposes.”(7) It is, as Rorty says, always and 
already loyalty to a certain group of people. As such, morality is diverse 
and can be expanded; hence, larger loyalties result in the diverse overlaps 
of moralities, or vice versa. The abstract rational principles of morality are 
made mostly when we envisage that it is better for us to use them so as to 
deal with “thin morality” in various ways. Thus, “if by rationality we mean 
simply the sort of activity that Walzer thinks of as a thinning-out process—
the sort that, with luck, achieves the formulation and utilization of an 
overlapping consensus— then the idea that justice has a different source 
than loyalty no longer seems plausible.”(8)
It is feasible that coming to see ourselves as members of a global 
moral community, whatever it is, lead us to think of justice as a loyalty to 
it in such away that we start to feel a certain binding force of morality by 
attending to sensitively understanding, and empathetically coming terms 
with, others outside our moral community or tradition of morality— in our 
terms, by laterally transcending our moral boundaries.
A question arises here: does this view that counts us as members of 
the universal community of humanity as a whole long for the universal 
and cosmopolitan morality? While foreseeing a “global moral community,” 
Rorty gives advice to the American left he avouches himself, an advice 
that confounds them: he admonishes them to look up a sense of national 
identity and a sense of national pride. American political philosopher 
Martha Nussbaum is surely bewildered by that advice. In her book For 
Love of Country?, she writes:
In a well-known op-ed piece in the New York Times (13 February 
1994), philosopher Rorty urges Americans, especially the American 
left, not to disdain patriotism as a value, and indeed to give central 
importance to “the emotion of national pride” and “a sense of 
shared national identity.” Rorty argues that we cannot even criticize 
ourselves well unless we also “rejoice” in our American identity 
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and define ourselves fundamentally in terms of that identity. Rorty 
seems to hold that the primary alternative to a politics based 
on patriotism and national identity is what he calls a “politics of 
difference,” one based on internal divisions among America’s ethic, 
rational, religious, and other subgroups. He nowhere considers the 
possibility of a more international basis for political emotion and 
concern.(9)
It is undeniable that Rorty keeps firmly in mind some common moral 
property between those who share the same nationality. I think that 
Nussbaum is right about Rorty’s vision of a “politics of difference” here. 
In fact, he maintains a sort of ethnocentrism in that aligning with Walzer’s 
thick-thin distinction he conceives of morality as starting from thickening 
with parochial loyalties; he says, “You know more about your family than 
about your village, more about your village than about your nation, more 
about your nation than about humanity as a whole.”(10) And he continues to 
say,
You are in a better position to decide what differences between 
individuals are morally relevant when dealing with those whom 
you can describe thickly, and in a worse position when dealing with 
those whom you can describe thinly. This is why, as groups get 
larger, law has to replace custom, and abstract principles have to 
replace phrone-sis. So Kantians are wrong to see phrone-sis as a thick-
ening up of thin abstract principles.(11)
I think that Rorty’s vision of a “global moral community” is leastwise not 
the sort of Kantian cosmopolitanism. This is because, even if the universal 
community as humanity at large is realized, Rorty attributes the ethical 
binding force of that community not to universal moral principles but more 
than anything to sensitivity and empathy of those who voice solidarity and 
practice it with others. He does not require those abstract principles, which 
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are envisaged by reason and are somehow prior to the loyalties, to be the 
basis of such an ethical binding force. It is in this regard that lateral ethics 
is resonance with the vision of a “global moral community.” Both of them 
are consonant with one another also in that they count moral obligations, 
not mentioning the loyalties, as once demarcated between the inside and 
outside of national boundaries. This, of course, implies that our moral 
obligations ever expand beyond the national boundary when we weigh 
each expecting result of the conflicting moral principles by expanding 
our sensitivity and empathy to the moral issues of those who live in other 
nations. Hence, the global moral community Rorty envisages is not so 
much justified by “the notion of universal moral obligations created by 
memberships in the species” as pursued by substituting for that notion “the 
idea of building a community of trust between ourselves and others.”(12) 
Therefore, Rorty’s notion of the global moral community along with the 
view of lateral ethics on the latter is nothing to do with rationalistic founda-
tionalism which provides a foundation for cosmopolitanism: rather, it has to 
do with practice.
  
4. Moral Identity and Exclusion
Expanding one’s moral identity to other communities or enlarging 
one’s loyalty to the larger community that comprises the community to 
which one belongs involves a matter of exclusiveness. Whatever kind 
of community has a tendency to exclude its members who trespass its 
intracommunity-morality. We tend to get a feeling of guilt when we depart 
from our own community and its intracommunity-morality, whereas we 
tend to get a feeling of innocence as of being just when we comply with the 
intracommunity-morality, that is, when we are loyal to it. This is why we 
are prone to exclude non-conforming people of our community: the risk of 
exclusion.
The same risk is leeched onto Ror ty’s notion of global moral 
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community and also the notion of lateral ethics. Such exclusion can 
generally be found in the following: intolerant religious dogmatism; narrow-
minded nationalism and exclusive ethnocentrism that arise from a sense of 
cultural and ethnic superiority and the consciousness of the chosen people; 
the idea that counts neighboring countries as being at the lower rank of 
the pecking order while counting one’s home country as the center of the 
world without ever coming to the idea that such hierarchy or such ordering 
principle is only relativistic and cannot be imposed on other countries or 
nations unless involving the threat, or even the use, of force.
It should be aware that all of these lead to derogation, prejudice, 
discrimination, and finally exclusion or extinction to an extreme. Exclusion 
as such cannot nonetheless be annihilated; rather, it is part and parcel of 
the nature of intracommunity-morality. And that is a sort of ethical aporia. 
Nowhere is that more apparent than in the antagonistic property between 
intracommunity-morality and more comprehensive ethic to which the 
latter is oriented. That antagonistic property, not exclusion per se, is even 
necessary for shaping one’s identity in the community to which one is 
loyal. For, without that, the moral boundaries between communities can 
eventually be swept away and the latter can consequently be conjoined and 
fused by the larger moral community, i.e., possibly by the global one.
Nevertheless, one’s moral identity is not definitively formed by a 
single group or community one identifies with. As Walzer maintains, many 
“moral voices” in fact are mixed in the self. Different “generalized others” 
as moral voices are incorporated into the self. This is why “it speaks with 
more than one moral voice—and that is why it is capable of self-criticism 
and prone to doubt, anguish, and uncer tainty.”(13) If we are indeed 
encouraged by an urge to expand the scope of the “voices” in spite of 
taking on skirmish of the different moral voices within the self, how should 
we then evade exclusion to the utmost extent?
What is required to resolve the ethical aporia is that we sensitively 
deal with the individual ethical situations of those concerned in light of 
their specific roles, responsibilities, sentiments, and basic needs; that 
ky6021Taniguchi_d.indd   30 16.1.24   4:18:53 AM
31Lateral Ethics, Moral Particularism, and Nationality
is to say, we attempt at grasping each ethical situation painstakingly, if 
necessary, at groping for realistically securing the necessary compromises: 
never that we cling to the universal moral principles. For conforming the 
intracommunity-morality or even the morality generally recognized in a 
nation to the universal moral principles (which per se transcend the realm 
of the relation of things and the relation between morality and the moral 
agent) could turn out to be just as painful as, as it were, making oneself 
conform to a Procrustean bed. Our intracommunity-morality might be 
forced to fit the overarching, universal moral principle whereas nobody 
ever knows whether or not it is an arbitrary standard. When conformity 
to the universal moral principles is conceived of, as often is by the cosmo-
politan moral theorist, as being tantamount to conforming to a wider, more 
inclusive moral identity that integrates different moral identities, there 
arises the risk that moral voices that are intermingled and conflicting with 
one another, or complement each other in the self might be drowned out by 
a growled command and converged with the single moral voice.
The (universal, rational and moral) principle-oriented theorist, or the 
cosmopolitan moral theorist, does not take account of the following two 
angles. Firstly, he or she nowhere considers the possibility that a wider, 
more inclusive moral identity can continue to be ameliorated in response 
to a variety of circumstances. Secondly, there exists the rigorous range of 
the binding moral force of the national community, the range that marks 
off its space. The cosmopolitan principle-oriented theorist conceives of that 
range as that which can easily be swept away as if it had no discriminating 
binding force. He or she thinks that moral boundaries can be cancelled 
out and integrated into the overarching moral circle by virtue of rational 
apprehension of the universal moral principle. Yet morality, I think, has its 
own reasons that reason per se takes no account of.
Lateral ethics takes account of the first angle. It considers the process 
of overlapping of moralities as unaccomplished process of growth. The 
latter is unending process of, as it were, making new circles of which the 
circumferences are often revised, and of which some disappear and others 
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expand. With John Dewey, lateral ethics claims that such moral “[g]rowth 
itself is the only ‘end’” it pursues.(14) In this regard we get into line with 
Dewey maintaining in the following:
The end is no longer a terminus or limit to be reached. It is 
the active process of transforming the existent situation. Not 
per fection as a final goal, but the ever-enduring process of 
per fecting, maturing, refining is the aim in living. Honesty, 
industry, temperance, justice, like health, wealth and learning, are 
not goods to be possessed as they would be if they express fixed 
ends to be attained. They are directions of change in the quality of 
experience.(15)
Thus, what we should consider next is how lateral ethics responds to 
the second angle.
5. Cosmopolitanism
I have mentioned that, although lateral ethics expands the scope of ethical 
connection through solidarity based on sensibility and empathy, the 
binding moral force of the community does not equally expand to humanity 
as a whole. I modeled lateral ethics to depicting the circle, which Augustine 
represented, i.e., as “a circle whose center is everywhere, and its circum-
ference nowhere.” This process implies by no means that wide-ranging 
circles eventually converge with the largest circle. In this illustration, there 
exist no circumferences and centers anywhere that set out a single largest 
circle, but the circle lateral ethics limns is one that is formed in a particular 
circumstance at different times.
Some leading philosophers insist on situating the largest circle outside 
all the concentric moral circles that are limned according to individual 
selves in individual situations and hence that all local circles are subsumed 
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under the largest circle, i.e., a single ethical community as humanity at 
large. Nussbaum, who is one of them, upholds such a view.
They [The Stoics] suggest that we think ourselves not as devoid of 
local afflictions, but as surrounded by a series of concentric circles. 
The first one encircles the self, the next takes in the immediate 
family, then follows the extended family, then, in order, neighbors 
or local groups, fellow city-dwellers, and fellow countrymen—and 
we can easily add to this list groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, 
historical, professional, gender, or sexual identities. Outside all 
these circles is the largest one, humanity as a whole. Our task as 
citizens of the world will be to “draw the circles somehow toward 
the center” (Stoic philosopher Hierocles, 1st-2nd CE.), making all 
human beings more like our fellow city-dwellers, and so on.(16)
Stoic philosophers Nussbaum deals with here are those whom she reckons 
to be the fathers of cosmopolitans. She contends that “[o]ne should always 
behave so as to treat with equal respect the dignity of reason and moral 
choice in every human being,”(17) and that “we should also work to make 
all human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern, base 
our political deliberations on that interlocking commonality, and give the 
circle that defines our humanity special attention and respect.”(18) This is 
undoubtedly a form of cosmopolitanism. It is both rationalism and univer-
salism in that above all things it pays equal respect to individual reason 
and longs for the universal expansion of human dignity based on human 
reason.
This penchant for cosmopolitanism is apparent typically in immediate 
followers of Kant. Or someone like Friedrich von Hayek, though he does 
not accept rationalism, considers moral circles that stay within national 
boundaries as “tribal sentiments,”(19) i.e., “our sentiments are controlled 
by instinct appropriate for hunting groups.”(20) Hence he identifies moral 
circles with “tribal sentiments” that should be converged to the largest 
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“circumference,” viz., the sole universal morality. He thus presumes nation-
ality to be both the road to nationalism and the old mirage that should be 
cleared off. Cosmopolitans in general do not so much reckon nationality as 
the legitimate source of ethical identity as regard limits to overcome.
One of the definite deficiencies of cosmopolitanism lies in its under-
standing of relation between nationality and identity of the individual moral 
agent. As English political philosopher David Miller rightly says, “identi-
fying with a nation, feeling yourself inextricably part of it, is a legitimate 
way of understanding your place in the world.”(21) That a person belongs 
to a nation forms an important part, if not all, of his or her identity. But 
“although at any moment there will be something substantial that we call 
our national identity, and we will acknowledge customs and institutions that 
correspond to this, there is no good reason to regard this as authoritative in 
the sense that excludes critical assessment.”(22) Furthermore, “the meaning 
of membership changes with time.”(23) That people have the same national 
identity means that they realize their same belongingness, and that for that 
reason they feel the same responsibility and loyalty. And the latter are thin 
in the moral agent cosmopolitanism considers.
The individual with a thin national identity, being devoid of the values 
of nation as ethical community and of experiences of moral judgments in 
everyday life, is not capable of making an ethical choice and decision in 
ways that commensurate everyday situation. Such a choice will not even 
be ethically valuable for that individual, for he lacks the normative sources 
inextricably embedded in national values out of which he makes a moral 
judgment. Lateral ethics attributes those values to public culture that is 
shaped by national characteristics common to the people (a nation) who 
share the same national identity. And the moral agent launches ethical 
thinking from the values of public culture as the edge. In addition, the 
moral agent becomes engaged with various moral communities and 
groups existing within national boundaries in various ways, and he does 
moral thinking also by beginning at that engagement. Thus, expunging 
the boundaries of these values as inappropriate and unnecessary for the 
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identity of the world citizens, and, accordingly, confounding public culture 
within the national boundaries with the world outside, are not so much a 
rash of speculation as fundamentally wrong one.
6. Moral Universalism
It is ethical universalism that is the theoretical basis of cosmopolitan ethical 
thinking. According to ethical universalism, the individual with a rational 
capacity for judgment and choice makes an ethical judgment subjectively 
by virtue of rational reflection congruent with some universal ethical 
principles, and the rationally choosing subjectivity of the agent is seen to 
be precedent to a variety of relations between the other individuals and that 
agent.
Unlike ethical universalism, lateral ethics, as is discussed in this paper 
or primarily in my recent book Lateral Ethics: Beyond Rorty, Hayek, and 
Singer,(24) doses not, in principle, aim to conform particular cases to the 
general ethical principles. It rejects first to accept principles like “Act as 
you decrease pains of all the animals that can feel pain and as you increase 
their pleasure” or “Do not act in such a way as to use others for the sake of 
your own benefits,” and then to conform one’s conduct to those principles. 
It has nothing to do with the universalization of morality that is done by 
conforming to the human nature, atemporal reality, and rational principles, 
although it is to be noted that it does not deny the universalization of 
morality per se.
Lateral ethics does not offer a moral agent the list of the order of 
priority that suggests the definite procedures of conflict-resolution by 
always placing the moral principles with the lower priority above the 
moral principles with the higher priority when he faces conflicts between 
those moral principles. This is because that could such a list of the order 
of priority be made, the moral agent’s moral dilemma and the consequent 
distress would not ever exist at all.
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Moreover, lateral ethics is also skeptical of Kantian moral universalism 
on which Nussbaum draws. Distinguishing the absolute moral principles 
(viz., perfect duties) that cannot be overturned by any moral principle from 
imperfect duties, Kant argues that if the strict condition that the absolute 
moral principle should not conflict with other absolute moral principles 
is satisfied, there possibly exists more than one absolute moral principle. 
But it is skeptical whether such a pretty stiff condition can actually be met. 
Furthermore, it is quite possible that not absolute (thus can be overturned) 
moral principles, i.e., imperfect duties, conflict with respect to one another 
in Kant’s moral theory. That means then that it is not conclusive which 
duty is weightier for each individual case when there exist certain conflicts 
between imperfect duties.
Deciding which duty is weightier pertains to judgment, and besides, 
we reject that there exist a priori identified criteria and methods for that 
judgment. In fact, in order to get unbiased judgment, it is necessary for 
one to sensitively consider to his or her best knowledge the details of the 
given situation as far as possible. This consideration or weighing should 
entail sensitivity endorsed by enriched experience germane to morality. 
Without sensitivity, moral judgment is tantamount to the mere calculation 
of the weighing of duties. As David McNaughton writes, “Just as someone 
can only be well qualified to judge in aesthetic matters if he has wide 
experience of different kinds of art, and the right kind of sensitivity to 
react to them suitably, so judging moral questions aright requires a wide 
experience of life and a suitable range of emotional response.”(25)
It should be aware that whether and to what extent the properties 
of the action that is done according to such a moral judgment are aright 
are determined by the characteristics of the other properties of the action 
when we make an assessment on its results. Let us illustrate this by means 
of the often-referred property, “pleasure” and “joy.”(26) I take my children 
camping for retreat they have been waiting for. They will be fully enjoying 
themselves. I will do the right thing, for I will give them pleasure. Should 
we then think an action aright whenever it conduces to pleasure?  No. 
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Imagine: a government reintroduces public execution for heinous crimes. 
The reason for the reintroduction is that many a bystander enjoyed 
the spectacle of public execution back in time when the institution was 
implemented. But is it valid to say that even now people would enjoy the 
spectacle?  They will strongly object to the reintroduction because they 
now believe public execution is cruel and anti-humanitarian. Only when we 
understand in what situation joy is resulted are we in a position to be able 
to morally evaluate whether the judgment is aright. Those situations differ 
greatly in property. Joy in a certain situation may be the primary property, 
and yet may not be in another situation. In this illustration, facing the 
property “cruelty,” the property “joy” loses deciding impact on judgment.
Which feature of an action in a certain situation contribute to the moral 
property of the action differs in individual situations, since the contribution, 
as is already seen, is determined in relation to the other properties brought 
about in the situation. Thus we cannot derive some general answer appli-
cable to other cases from well-considered individual results as to which 
moral property is weightier in particular cases. Nevertheless, this does not 
imply that we should weigh those moral properties equal ignoring those 
results. We should not suppose that we could specify a moral choice a 
priori right. Instead, we should think that it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to drive at judgments as to which property we should choose. What is true 
for moral property is true for moral principle as well. We cannot derive the 
general moral principle from individual moral judgments as to which duty 
is weightier in particular cases. Therefore, we should think that the general 
or even universal moral principles in fact seem to be unhelpful in our 
particular moral judgments.
7. Moral Particularism
My position in ethics can be epitomized as follows. We should sensitively 
consider the details of a particular case relying on basic moral sense such 
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as sensitivity and prudence when we are required to decide as to which 
duty or principle is weightier in the particular case in which moral duties 
or moral principles conflict. This position is usually called “moral particu-
larism.” It is largely skeptical of ethical universal principles.
There are two notions that strongly back up the role of moral 
principles: generality of the moral principle and consistency of moral 
judgments.
Let us first examine the former. According to moral particularist 
McNaughton, moral particularism can be discerned as to whether it denies 
that satisfying the items of the complete checklist of “non-moral properties” 
determines moral properties like the rightness and wrongness of action.(27) 
Non-moral properties are the properties that generate the moral properties 
(i.e., the rightness and wrongness) of the action of an agent; for instance, 
a non-moral property could be the pain induced by the action and be just 
a story of the agent that brings about flam. Suppose now that I casually 
make a promise to take the children camping while having not the least 
intention to do so and that I cancel the whole plan making a plausible 
excuse on the appointed day. In this case the falsity and the disappointment 
of the children are the non-moral properties and telling a lie makes the 
cancelling morally wrong. Thus if the reason that this action is morally 
wrong involves telling a lie, the wrongness of acting like that must be the 
wrongness of other actions that involve telling a lie. I must appeal to the 
non-moral property that makes an action wrong when I deliver the reason 
for defending the claim that the action is wrong. Moral particularism denies 
that we should decide whether the action is morally wrong according to 
whether the complete checklist of non-moral properties that is made by 
clearly describing every one of them and thus applicable to any situation 
is satisfied; moral particularist renounces the general application of the 
complete checklist to individual moral situations.
Secondly, let us examine the notion “consistency” of moral judgments. 
The moral particularist thinks that we can demonstrate “a genuine and 
consistent sensitivity to the presence of some moral property without it 
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being the case that there is any recognizable pattern, at the non-moral 
level, in the properties of the agents or actions to which he applies the 
term.”(28) By contrast, the non-cognitivist thinks that there exist no moral 
properties that exist independently of our evaluations; our use of the evalu-
ative terms of moral approval or disapproval becomes understandable when 
we select the same non-evaluative features in a consistent way so that the 
agents approve or disapprove morally. This is, the non-cognitivist thinks, 
how it becomes understandable what they approve or disapprove morally.
We agree that we should consistently use the terms applied to the 
moral properties. But that we exhibit a genuine and consistent sensitivity 
to the presence of some moral property does not necessarily require some 
recognizable consistency at the level of non-moral properties, for there is 
no necessary connection between demonstrating a consistent sensitivity to 
the moral properties of the actions of the agent and consistently using of 
the terms applied to the other features of the actions that happen to induce 
those moral properties.
Contrary to what is often said by mistake, moral particularism does 
not deny the moral principles as such. As we already saw, it takes its stand 
on conferring no central position to the moral principles in making moral 
judgments. Lateral ethics is a sort of modest moral particularism in that 
it also takes the same stance. Both moral particularism and lateral ethics 
do not oppose to the actions that are based on the moral principles. The 
reason why both of them do not mind relying on the moral principles as the 
case may be is twofold: first, doing so is useful in some instances; second, 
according to Eriksonian developmental psychology, there exists the devel-
opmental process of humankind’s moral psychology in which each stage in 
life has a corresponding moral or psychological principle, the principles to 
which one may conform differ according to one’s developmental stages in 
life.
Perhaps, the latter needs elucidation somewhat. Suppose the case of 
the child who grew up being told that she must be tried by the court and 
expiate if she commits a criminal act. And the police inspector now asks the 
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child if her parent who committed a crime is hiding himself at home. Even 
if she has reached the age of reason, it is usual or even natural that she has 
a way of not telling the police that he is home simply because social justice 
must be done. Perhaps she could not even have a notion of social justice. 
She conforms to her deep loyalty to her farther; she does so out of love. 
Nevertheless, she could inform to the police if she were grown up enough 
to embrace the notion and to take very seriously the rigorous maintenance 
of the social order out of a certain ideology. Further, if this youngster will 
grow up passing through the strain of hardship, regret, self-contradiction, 
and sorrow in life and will finally become an old person of well-seasoned 
character, and being faced with a moral dilemma at some time in her life, 
she will probably deal with the case in an open-minded attitude out of 
enriched mature consideration. Envisaging moral development in such 
an epigenetic way is endorsed by experience and wisdom that we come to 
acquire through our life. Hence the moral principles one may conform to 
differ according to one’s developmental stages. Moral dilemmas are not the 
result of a conflict between justice and sentiment or between loyalty and the 
moral and psychological principle of each developmental stage in life but 
between alternative loyalties, alternative moral personhoods that epigeneti-
cally come into being, alternative ways of relating to and dealing with a 
particular moral situation.
This view is nothing more or less than that complying with each moral 
principle of the given stage of life is in fact useful for solving moral matters 
in our actual life. Moral principles are useful in some cases in order that we 
may expand the scope of ethical connections through the solidarity based 
on sensitivity and empathy. In this wise, lateral ethics and moral particu-
larism share the view that appealing to the moral principle does not prove 
decisive of moral judgments though neither of them renounces it to the 
extent that it is typically proper to the corresponding developmental stage.
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8. Moral Particularism and Lateral Ethics
Thus I think that lateral ethics has a negative view of ethical universalism 
and is sympathetic about moral particularism. Notably lateral ethics does 
not side with the cosmopolitan ethical universalism that believes some 
universal cosmopolitan community will prevail comprising or cancelling 
out national boundaries in the last analysis. There exist a variety of commu-
nities with the morally binding force within the inexorably existing national 
boundaries. In On Nationality, Miller talks about the fact that when we 
expand the moral circle to the extent that the national boundary consisting 
of the duties we owe to our fellow nationals is the outmost located circum-
ference of the circle of morality there exist various communities with 
contrasting features within the boundary. He says as follows:
[N]ations are ethical communities. They are contour lines in the 
ethical landscape. The duties we owe to our fellow-nationals are 
dif ferent from, and more extensive than, the duties we owe to 
human beings as such. This is not to say that we owe no duties to 
humans as such; nor is it to deny that there may be other, perhaps 
smaller and more intense, communities to whose members we 
owe duties that are more stringent still than those we owe to 
Britons, Swedes, etc., at large. But it is to claim that a proper 
account of ethics should give weight to national boundaries, and 
that in particular there is no objection in principle to institutional 
schemes—such as welfare states— that are designed to deliver 
benefits exclusively to those who fall within the same boundaries as 
ourselves.(29)
Miller and other moral particularists with no exception describe ethical 
life as pluralistic. Nevertheless, I do not think that the description of such 
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contour lines suits their purpose. Nussbaum’s illustration of concentric 
circles and Miller’s illustration of contour lines together express the 
inclusive relation regarding human interests and loyalty. Both Nussbaum’s 
cosmopolitanism (that explains the familiar individual morality beginning 
with some non-conflicting, universal moral principles which are the basis 
of the supposed ethical world-community) and Miller’s moral particularism 
(that gives a heavy weight to the moral duties to nationals and to the 
feelings that regard as morally important special loyalty to nation or nation 
state) cannot cast aside the doubt that both sides are to be absorbed into 
the ethic of one large community; that is, the individual intracommunity-
morality into the national ethic and the ethic of nations into the singular 
cosmopolitan ethic.
In contrast, let us understand the pluralistic ethical life to be the whole 
relation between distinct kinds of societal institutions (e.g., family, religion, 
education, medical care, welfare, and the state) and the various distinct 
spheres of culture (e.g., sport, music, art, traditional performing arts, and 
literature).(30) Having its proper jurisdiction limited by and defined by the 
specific nature of the sphere concerned, each individual sphere is of its 
own unique scope, decision-making power, responsibility and even ethic or 
norm which may not be usurped by those in authority in another sphere, 
for example, the state. There is no distinction of rank regarding their 
authorities. The relations between them are not hierarchical but lateral: 
they are rhizomatous. When those spheres are usurped, that is, their 
autonomy, distinctiveness, authority and ethic are impaired or, at worse, 
lost due to the usurpation, they cease to function properly or become 
dysfunctional: they are no longer what they are.
Construed in this way, the pluralistic ethical life starts to look not like 
“contour lines in the ethical landscape” but rather like cohesion of those 
spheres laterally situated with respect to one another, since it cannot be 
reduced altogether to the inclusive relation. In addition, considering also 
that there exist a variety of communities and associations specialized for 
those spheres brings into perspective the landscape of expanding moral 
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circles intersecting with each other, which can hardly be depicted by 
“contour lines” or “concentric circles.” This landscape is reminiscent of 
the image of “a circle whose center is everywhere, and its circumference 
nowhere.” When the ethical landscape Miller depicts is replaced by the 
image of the lateral relations, it transforms into the landscape of the 
morally binding force that works on the nexus of the relations while 
comprising the pluralistic communities interwoven into them.
Thus the circles lateral ethics depicts are neither concentric circles nor 
contour lines. Their centers point to particular moral judgments that are to 
be made by sensitively examining moral issues. Some of those centers may 
happen to be yet the same; most of them are apart or close one another. 
Obviously the “center” here stands for the particular moral judgment or the 
individual moral agent who makes it; the “circumference” for the scope of 
the resulting effects and their gravity. When, designating those centers as 
our starting point, we sensitively and empathetically consider other centers 
(i.e., the moral judgments other agents make in other moral situations), 
there emerges mutual understanding between other centers and ours, 
viz., other agents and us. Just as the distances between those centers are 
varied, so is the mutual understanding varied according to the distances. 
The centers neither converge with one and only center; nor does one and 
only kind of mutual understanding sweep up that mutual understanding. 
In fact those centers are laterally linked one another. It is exactly what 
makes them linked that is loyalty, which is formed by the nexus of bonds 
and relations brought about by such mutual understanding. It is this lateral 
linkage that is what I call “overlapping morality” or “overlaps of different 
moralities.”
Lateral ethics seeks to exhibit sensitivity to details of a particular 
situation at times in which we are to make a moral judgment particularly 
so that it can sensitively address that situation to the extent possible. And 
we come into linking with people of other communities through empathy 
and the overlapping loyalty that is generated by getting in tune with the 
moral binding force of the societal sphere in which that situation primarily 
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arises. Whereas we ethically reason through sensitivity and empathy, if at 
all possible, by sensitively consider details of ethical matters that arise in 
the lateral or rhizomatous relations between those spheres or communities. 
Construed in this way, lateral ethics seeks as well to go beyond the scope of 
the ethic that Miller depicts. When we expand our sensitivity and empathy 
to gear toward individual moral issues outside national boundaries and 
when accordingly our ethical obligation expands beyond national bound-
aries, we obtain a momentum that an ethic is developed in the wider scope 
across national boundaries. Such expansion of ethic neither is longing for 
the cosmopolitan, universal moral principles nor is inconsistent with moral 
particularism.
9. Concluding Remarks
Based on moral particularism, I argued that lateral ethics has a negative 
view of seeking to found ethics on any form of ethical cosmopolitanism 
and its theoretical foundation, i.e., ethical universalism. However, I do not 
deny that we can build a moral bond with people of other communities by 
transcending the boundaries of one’s own moral community and that such 
solidarity accordingly even expands across national boundaries. What I 
deny is that such solidarity converges with fairly large, if not one and only, 
loyalty that is vigorous enough to transelement one’s national culture, 
history, and identity. Needless to say, I do not regard imposing one’s own 
morality on others and other communities by elevating oneself as lateral 
ethics. In that sense, prudence or common sense of some sort is always 
and already incorporated into lateral ethics; and, for this reason, it is a kind 
of virtue ethics. Larger communities like nation, let alone home, school, 
local community, and so forth, nurture such prudence and such common 
sense as well as sensitivity to moral situations.
ky6021Taniguchi_d.indd   44 16.1.24   4:18:55 AM
45Lateral Ethics, Moral Particularism, and Nationality
The Public
As makeshift agendas—viz., socially common agendas that 
cannot be personally resolved by individuals alone—that are, 
under civil agreement, thus to seek to be resolved by means of 
institutional policy in cooperation with each government on the 
pluralistic and multi-layered levels.
Public
Sphere
Public network(ing) that is formed by sharing public agendas and 
by collectively resolving them in the civil society of which the 
structure is pluralistic and multi-layered. 
Public Ethic
The codes of conduct that are made continuously by virtue of 
empathy, sharing, and mutual cooperation between communities 
and individuals in the pluralistic and multi-layered civil society.
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